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REJOINDER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, 
AND THE AMERICAN WAY-OR 
PROFESSOR HADDAD'S "HARD 
CHOICES" 
John M. Burko:tr 
I frankly think that Professor Haddad's response to my article 
on pretext searches is first-rate. It is articulate; it is thoughtful 
and scholarly; it sharpens the issues and the analysis in this 
area; and, for the most part, I think his criticisms of various por-
tions of my own work present my positions fairly and honestly. 
On the other hand, I think that Professor Haddad is dead 
wrong. 
Where do we disagree? Haddad's response is carefully thought 
out and the argumentation is intricate. Hence, it should come as 
no surprise that we disagree on a great many points, too many 
for an itemized response in this brief rejoinder. But I think it is 
safe to say that we disagree fundamentally on three things: (1) 
what message can be fairly drawn from the Supreme Court's 
"pretext decisions"; (2) whether a subjective approach to pretext 
analysis is desirable; and (3) whether any other ap-
proach-particularly Haddad's own "hard-choice" approach-is 
a more desirable solution to the pretext problem. 
I. SUPREME COURT "PRETEXT DECISIONS" 
A key argument in my University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform article was, as Haddad notes, that Supreme Court deci-
sional law on the subject of pretext searches reveals a decided 
ambiguity. 1 The gist of my argument was that although the 
Court sloughed off a concern about deterring pretext searches in 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,2 it retained this concern 
in other .decisions.3 Hence, the argument continued, reason ex-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. A.B., 1970; J.D., 1973, University of 
Michigan; L.L.M., 1976, Harvard University. 
1. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 523, 524-25, 544-50 (1984). 
2. 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). 
3. Burkoff, supra note 1, at 544-48. 
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ists to believe that the Court's implicit rejection of the pretext 
search doctrine in Villamonte-Marquez was unintended. 4 
Haddad's response to this point is that none of the Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with the pretext search issue adopted a 
subjective approach to the analysis of pretexts. Rather, as Had-
dad views the cases, "the Supreme Court has consistently taken 
into account the possibility of pretextual fourth amendment ac-
tivity in determining whether to expand a particular · fourth 
amendment limitation upon police conduct . . . . This is the 
hard-choice approach."6 Accordingly, Haddad maintains, the Su-
preme Court's implicit rejection in Villamonte-Marquez of a 
case-by-case (subjective or objective) approach to the pretext is-
sue does not indicate a lack of concern on the part of the Court 
about the issue of pretexts. Rather, the Court simply likes Had-
dad's pretext approach better than mine-or Professor 
LaFave's.6 
Now, I can live with rejection by the Supreme Court. In some 
of the circles in which I travel, such rejection might be construed 
as a badge of honor. But I honestly do not believe I have been so 
honored by the Court-at least not to this date. I think that 
Haddad is mistaken when he argues that the Court has "consist-
ently" used a "hard-choice" approach to deal with pretext 
problems. 7 Some Supreme Court decisions, which cannot fairly 
be viewed as "hard-choice" cases, imply clearly the existence of 
a congruent subjective approach to pretexts. The best example 
of such a case is South Dakota u. Opperman. 8 
4. Id. at 550. 
5. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Admendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 639, 673 (1985). 
6. Haddad categorized both LaFave's and my approach to this subject as variants on 
a case-by-case analysis. Haddad, supra note 5, at 649-51. 
I cannot speak for LaFave, but as for myself, Haddad anticipates my reaction to this 
categorization when he acknowledges that "[o]f course, the Court could still reexamine 
various fourth amendment doctrines while simultaneously retaining an individual moti-
vation approach." Id. at 688. See infra text accompanying notes 25-27. Cf. Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 116 (1982): 
The analytical framework that has been outlined is straightforward. Initially, a 
court should determine whether a search is objectively constitutional or uncon-
stitutional. If the search is objectively unconstitutional, a court need proceed no 
further. If, however, the search is objectively constitutional, the court must next 
determine (if the issue is raised) whether the search was a 'bad faith' search. 
7. I am not arguing that Haddad is wrong on this point with respect to all of the 
cases he discusses, just that he is wrong with respect to some of them. I agree that there 
are some relatively recent decisions that can fairly be categorized as "hard-choice" cases 
in Haddad's analytical grid. I am thinking particularly here of Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204 (1981). See Haddad, supra note 5, at 664-65. 
8. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
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In Opperman, the Supreme Court legitimized suspicionless 
automobile inventory searches, but only after noting that the in-
ventory search in question was not "a pretext concealing an in-
vestigatory motive."9 (Nit-pickers, please note: that is the Su-
preme Court bringing up "motive," not me.) I am far from alone 
in taking the radical position of reading the Opperman case as 
meaning just what it says. A great many, if not the overwhelm-
ing majority of, lower courts reaching the issue have read Opper-
man as mandating that automobile inventory searches are un-
constitutional when undertaken with an investigatory motive. 10 
Haddad's response to this point is simply to argue that "[s]uch 
an approach might be consistent with the quoted sentence [from 
Opperman], but it is not a course that the sentence com-
mands."11 Haddad elsewhere acknowledges, however, that a 
"hard-choice" rather than a subjective test reading of Opper-
man "undermine[s] somewhat the three purposes of inventory 
searches that the Supreme Court recognized as legitimate."12 
Strike the word "somewhat" and Haddad and I are in 
agreement. 
Moreover, consider a case not discussed by Professor Haddad. 
In Michigan v. Clifford,13 decided after I wrote my University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform article, the Supreme Court 
held that an individual can in some circumstances retain a pri-
vacy interest in fire-damaged premises sufficient to require fire 
officials to obtain a warrant prior to entry subsequent to extin-
guishing the fire; Whether the fire officials, however, need a 
criminal search warrant or an (easier-to-get) administrative war-
rant turns on-mirabile dictu-the officials' motive. As Justice 
Powell held for a plurality of the Court: 
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search de-
termines the type of warrant required. If the primary ob-
ject is to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, 
an administrative warrant will suffice. . . . 
If the primary object of the search is to gather evi-
dence of criminal activity, a criminal search warrant [is 
9. Id. at 376. 
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Landamus, 333 Pa. Super. 382, 390, 482 A.2d 619, 623 
(1984) (finding automobile inventory search unconstitutional under Opperman as "police 
had a motive to search for evidence when they seized the car"). See also Burkoff, supra 
note 6, at 79 n.40. Haddad recognizes that this subjective approach is "popular with 
many reviewing courts." Haddad, supra note 5, at 1. See also id. at 649, 693. 
11. Haddad, supra note 5, at 663. 
12. Id. (footnote omitted). 
13. 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984). 
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required] 
The object of the search is important even if exigent 
circumstances exist. 14 
Haddad has learned to predict my hypothesized responses to 
his criticisms rather well;111 so let me give his hypothesized re-
sponses to mine a crack. "John," he will patiently tell me, "Clif-
ford is simply not a pretext case-you've screwed up again!" 
"Jim," I patiently respond, "the point is only that the Supreme 
Court has made clear that an arson investigator who attempts to 
justify a search with an administrative warrant where his motive 
was really to search for criminal evidence-a search justified 
only with a criminal search warrant-has acted unconstitution-
ally." Equally significant, the Court explicitly eschewed a "hard-
choice" analysis in Clifford. Rather, case-by-case analysis of fire 
investigators' motivation was clearly and purposefully antici-
pated, despite the fact that Justice Powell recognized that "[i]n 
many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefight-
ers' investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evi-
dence of arson."16 In Clifford, as in Opperman, the Court 
deemed evidence of an investigatory motive sufficient to render 
the type of administrative search in question unconstitu-
tional-and, I might add, for a very good reason: because the 
criminal search that was in fact undertaken was not undertaken 
for the administrative reasons that purported to justify it. 
I do not want to belabor discussion of Supreme Court deci-
sional precedent. I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Haddad 
14. Id. at 647. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the plural-
ity's assessment of the law on this point, noting that "[w]e are ... unanimous in our 
opinion that after investigators have determined the cause of the fire and located the 
place it originated, a search of other portions of the premises may be conducted only 
pursuant to a warrant, issued upon probable cause that a crime has been committed." Id. 
at 650. 
15. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 5, at 670-71. 
16. 104 S. Ct. at 649 n.9. Justice Powell reasoned that lower courts could deal with 
this evidentiary problem by establishing some objective criteria to help determine the 
particular fire investigators' "primary object": "For example, once the cause of a fire in a 
single-family dwelling is determined, the administrative search should end and any 
broader investigation should be made pursuant to a criminal warrant." Id. 
A similar answer-that objective criteria can be developed, and are often used already, 
to assess the existence of subjective pretext-is at least partly responsive to Haddad's 
criticism of my "sole" motive test for assessing the existence of pretextual activity. See 
Haddad, supra note 5, at 649, 674 n.158, 683-85. Nonetheless, Justice Powell's "primary 
object" test in Clifford may be, I confess, a more workable verbal formula than the one I 
proposed in 1982. See Burkoff, supra note 6, at 103-04. See also Haddad, supra note 5, 
at 684 (expressing a preference for Professor Brest's "significant role" test for motive 
used in another context). 
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that "for purposes of academic discussion, the most important 
thing is what the Supreme Court should do, not what ·it has 
done."17 But I do want to stress that the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in this area, while none of them presents the resounding 
endorsement of a subjective pretext analysis that I would prefer, 
at the very least, serve to establish the Court's ambiguity-and 
ambivalence?-on this subject.18 
II. DESIRABILITY OF SUBJECTIVE PRETEXT ANALYSIS 
Supreme Court precedent aside, Haddad summarized his com-
plaints about a subjective approach to pretexts as follows: 
The individual motivation methodology punishes the 
prosecution where an officer has acted within the letter of 
the law to further the laudable goal of obtaining incrimi-
nating evidence. More importantly, an individual motiva-
tion methodology shifts the focus away from the most 
important issues: the existence and scope of fourth 
amendment limitations. Unlike the hard-choice ap-
proach, it tends to inhibit critical' reassessment and de-
served expansion of fourth amendment limitations. 19 
I could not disagree more with Haddad when he argues in this 
passage-and in other places in his response-that an officer 
acting pretextually is nonetheless acting within "the letter of the 
law."2° Consider an officer making an investigatory search of a 
car under the purported legal authority of the non-investigatory 
inventory search rules. Haddad's position apparently is that the 
officer is acting lawfully, within "the letter of the law," because 
the Court in Opperman legitimized inventory searches, assum-
ing that the scope of the search in question is limited in inten-
17. Haddad, supra note 5, at 680. 
18. Haddad also acknowledges that the Supreme Court has, in United States v. Cec-
colini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978), adopted a subjective approach to assessing when the 
exclusionary rule should apply to police misconduct. See Haddad, supra note 5, at 667-
68. He then proceeds to dismiss the precedential value of this case as it was decided in a 
"quite different context." Id. at 668. All I use it to establish in my analysis, however, is 
what Haddad elsewhere concedes, that Ceccolini "suggests that even Justice Rehnquist, 
[the author of the majority opinion], might agree ... that sometimes a fourth amend-
ment issue should turn upon what is in a police officer's mind." Id .. 
19. Haddad, supra note 5, at 681. 
20. See id. at 645, 677, 681. As Haddad ultimately concedes, "to assert that ... an 
improperly motivated officer acts within the boundaries of an established fourth amend-
ment doctrine begs the question." Id. at 693. 
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sity to that associated with inventories. 21 But that was not the 
"letter of the law" in Opperman at all, unless by that phrase 
Haddad means what a reader might garner from the West Pub-
lishing Company's headnotes in a given case. As previously dis-
cussed, the Opperman Court legitimized only administrative in-
ventory searches, clearly distinguishing criminal investigatory 
searches made with the pretense that they were inventories. 
How can anyone seriously argue that the Supreme Court's in-
tent-or its result-in Opperman was to legitimize investigatory 
searches made without probable cause as long as such searches 
could be disguised as inventories? 
Moreover, unlike Professor Haddad, I do not find the 
goals-or the actions-of law enforcement officers acting pretex-
tually to obtain criminal evidence "laudable" in the slightest de-
gree. The point here is as much a moral as a constitutional one: 
the end does not justify the means. Police officers are always 
looking for criminal evidence. Great! That is what they are sup-
posed to do. Who would want it any other way? But the whole 
point of the fourth amendment-and the rest of the Bill of 
Rights-is that police officers must also have the concurrent goal 
of procuring evidence lawfully. Law enforcement officers cannot 
break down doors without probable cause, rummage through 
homes indiscriminately, or arrest anyone they want without suf-
ficient justification at law-even if they are honestly looking for 
criminal evidence in the process. To be "laudable," in my eyes, 
the police must follow the law, not just enforce it. 
Now, to give Haddad his due, he recognized that his "hard-
choice" analysis effectively "ignores" some pretexts, the exis-
tence of which can only be ascertained subjectively. But he of-
fers two responses to this problem. First, he argues, a subjective 
approach to pretext analysis is equally problematic: 
Of course, under my approach some officers will "get 
away" with pretextual fourth amendment activity even 
where no doubt exists that they exercised a fourth 
amendment power for the wrong reason. Yet, because of 
difficulty of proof, officers often will get away with 
pretextual searches under Professor Burkoff's approach 
as well.22 
Second, Haddad argues that a subjective approach to pretexts 
21. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12. 
22. Haddad, supra note 5, at 692. 
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will only result in the suppression of evidence seized as a result 
of pretextual activity "motivated by a desire to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence,"23 a perverse result because "[n]ormally we 
would expect praise for the officer who, while acting within the 
letter of the law, pursued this motive."24 
Neither of these responses, to my mind, is satisfactory. Under 
a subjective approach to pretexts, sometimes defense counsel 
will be unable to establish the truth, i.e., that the police officers 
in question acted pretextually. But that is the risk we run in any 
civil or criminal proceeding-that the process will not work, that 
the truth will not be established-and is hardly a reason for con-
cluding that counsel should ipso facto not be entitled to make 
the effort.211 More importantly, Haddad's first response assumes 
that I support only a subjective approach to pretext analysis and 
oppose the Supreme Court's concurrent use of the "hard choice" 
approach that Haddad contends could serve to diminish the in-
cidence of pretextual activity. This is not my position at all. I 
wholeheartedly agree with Haddad. that the "hard-choice" ap-
proach to pretext analysis can be useful. But I also believe that 
the "hard-choice" and subjective approaches can-and 
should-live together in peace.26 Indeed, the fact that pretexts 
are difficult for defense counsel to establish except in excep-
tional cases should give the Supreme Court additional incentive 
to make "hard choices" as to the desirable scope of fourth 
amendment powers as a generic matter.27 
I have just as much trouble with Haddad's second response. I 
come to bury pretexts, not to "praise" them.28 Haddad's argu-
23. Id. at 644. 
24. Id. at 645. 
25. "If justice requires (a] fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no 
ground for refusing to try." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881). Haddad else-
where concedes this point. Haddad, supra note 5, at 681-82. See also Burkoff, supra note 
6, at 111-16 (applying this maxim to the issue of pretext searches). 
26. See Burkoff, supra note 6. 
27. Professor Haddad's response to this point is that he "believe[s] ... that the 
availability of an individual motivation approach serves as a 'crutch.' " Haddad, supra 
note 5, at 688. See also id. at 681 ("an individual motivation methodology ... tends to 
inhibit critical reassessment and deserved expansion of fourth amendment limitations"). 
I really do not think there is any-or at least enough-evidence that this is true. But 
even if it were, given the fact that we are debating what the Court should do, the answer 
to this criticism is prescriptive rather than descriptive: simply put, the availability of a 
subjective pretext approach should not prevent courts from also dealing with this prob-
lem generically. Moreover, if Haddad is arguing that the absence of large numbers of 
"hard-choice" decisions can be explained by the presence-the "crutch"-of the "indi-
vidual motivation" analysis in pretext cases, then he has implicitly conceded the deci-
sional precedent point discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 1-18. 
28. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
702 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:3 
ment is, apparently, that because the only pretexts that result in 
suppression under a subjective approach are pretexts aimed at 
the discovery of incriminating evidence, we should be less con-
cerned about them. 29 I disagree completely. There is, to my 
mind, every reason to be concerned about pretexts-whatever 
their motivation. 30 Moreover, it is not necessarily true that only 
Haddad's arguably "praiseworthy" pretexts will lead to discov-
ery of evidence. Haddad's lecherous police officer who stops a 
car strictly in order to meet the attractive-driver31 may well dis-
cover that the secret behind the driver's attractive smile is co-
caine (in plain view). 
Furthermore, I believe Haddad misses an important point 
when he argues that use of a subjective pretext analysis will 
have only a misguided impact, i.e., it will apply only to deter 
those officers "who stop, detain, arrest, frisk, or search in the 
hope of obtaining criminal evidence" rather than those "who en-
gage in such fourth amendment activity because of fluttering 
hearts, personal spite, or racial bigotry."32 The use of a subjec-
tive pretext analysis carries with it a simple and understandable, 
if not classic, general deterrent message: to search, you must act 
for the reasons that justify the search. Why should it matter 
what a searching officer's illegitimate reasons are, whether he or 
she is searching for evidence or searching for a soul mate? The 
general deterrent message remains the same, that police officers 
must have lawful reasons to engage in search and seizure 
activity. 
Haddad says he "still believe[s] that it is strange to instruct 
police officers that they act improperly even when, for the pur-
pose of obtaining incriminating evidence, they act within the 
boundaries of a recognized exception to the warrant require-
ment. "33 On this point, I am afraid that we just keep talking 
past one another. I do not believe it is strange at all to instruct 
police officers that they must not pretend to act within the 
boundaries of the law, even when their purpose is to obtain in-
criminating evidence rather than to stop attractive drivers. 34 
29. Haddad, supra note 5, at 644-46, 691-92. 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
31. Haddad, supra note 5, at 644. 
32. Id. at 645. 
33. Id. at 691. 
34. Given a general deterrence justification for the exclusionary rule, one might have 
thought that a police officer's improper motives would be the perfect target for deter-
rence. However, as Professor Yale Kamisar has critically commented about the Supreme 
Court's response to the deterrence point in this setting: "In recent years, the 'deterrence' 
rationale of the exclusionary rule and its concomitant 'interest-balancing' have come to 
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Ill. DESIRABILITY OF "HARD-CHOICE" PRETEXT ANALYSIS 
I have already acknowledged that I have no objection to Had-
dad's "hard-choice" analysis per se. 8 r, My position is only that 
such an approach should not serve to replace, but rather should 
supplement, a subjective approach. The "hard-choice" approach 
is simply too inefficient with respect to deterrence of pretext 
searches and arrests to permit it to supplant the only analysis 
that insures that every time a defendant can demonstrate a pre-
text s.earch or arrest, a court will deal with the pretextual activ-
ity under the law, and not simply ignore it.36 
Finally, in all candor, another, if not the principal, problem 
with considering adoption of the "hard-choice" analysis in the 
"real world" is that I believe the "real world" Supreme Court 
will all too rarely use it. Perhaps this point illustrates the 
real-and fundamental-difference between Professor Haddad 
and myself in our respective approaches to pretext problems. He 
trusts the Supreme Court to make consistently the "hard 
choices" and I am a decided skeptic.37 In the last analysis, how-
ever, skeptical as I may be, I confess that I remain puzzled about 
one thing: why is there so much resistance to a pretext analysis 
that consists entirely of searching for-and applying-the truth? 
center stage. But the 'deterrence' rationale seems to be a one-way street-a basis for 
narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule but never, apparently, for expanding it." 
Kamisar, Introduction: Trends and Developments with Respect to That Amendment 
"Central to Enjoyment of Other Guarantees of The Bill of Rights," 17 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 409, 413 (1984). 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. 
36. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
37. See Burkoff, When is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Double-
think, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 515 (1984). 

